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Abstract 
How can people balance competing demands for efficiency and cognitive flexibility in 
understanding others’ beliefs and desires? The idea that humans have two systems for 
mindreading, a flexible but cognitively demanding system and a minimal, efficient system 
which operates quickly but possesses signature blindspots was tested. Spontaneous 
anticipatory looking (AL) and direct verbal predictions of 3- and 4- year-olds were assessed. 
Children’s AL responses displayed a signature blindspot to an agent’s desire to avoid an 
object in an unexpected-transfer false belief task. A dissociation between 4-year-olds’ 
spontaneous AL responses and direct verbal predictions in an avoidance task further supports 
a 2-mindreading-systems account. The quick efficient mindreading system tracks an agent’s 
desire to approach but not to avoid an object.  
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Pre-schoolers’ Reasoning in a False-Belief Test Involving Negative Desires 
The understanding that an agent’s internal mental states (thoughts, beliefs, and 
desires) are influenced by the agent’s perception of the environment, and in turn dictate that 
agent’s likely actions, is a hallmark of the possession of a theory of mind (ToM). A theory of 
mind helps people to understand and negotiate their social world. ToM research was 
stimulated by the publication of the paper “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?” 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978). In a commentary on this paper, Dennett (1978) offered a 
methodological solution that has come to be known as the false-belief task. An observer and 
an agent observe a scenario. The observer observes a change in the environment which an 
agent is unaware of. Thus the agent holds a false-belief about the environment. The observer 
must infer the agent’s mistaken belief in order to correctly predict the agent’s action.  
Following on from Dennett’s (1978) suggestions, Wimmer and Perner (1983) 
investigated young children’s understanding of false-belief. They told children a story about a 
child named Maxi. Maxi puts some chocolate in a cupboard, and goes outside to play. Whilst 
Maxi is outside, his mother takes the chocolate from the cupboard in order to use some in her 
baking. Then, rather than returning the chocolate to the cupboard, she places it into a drawer. 
Maxi’s mother leaves the scene. Maxi returns and children were asked where Maxi would 
look for the chocolate. In order to answer correctly, children must understand that Maxi holds 
a false belief about the location of the chocolate – Maxi believes the chocolate is in the 
cupboard where he left it, rather than in its current location, the drawer. This type of task, in 
which an object is unexpectedly moved from one location to another, is often called an 
unexpected transfer task. Another version of the false-belief task involves objects with 
unexpected contents. Unexpected contents tasks can be used to demonstrate to the child that 
they themselves can hold a false-belief about a situation (Hogrefe, Wimmer, & Perner, 1986; 
Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). In such tasks, children are shown a familiar container, 
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for example a container of a brand of popular sweets, and asked what is in the package. 
Typically, children name the popular sweets. The package is then opened to reveal 
unexpected contents, for example a pencil. Children are then asked what another person who 
is shown the container will think is inside. Gopnik and Astington (1988) showed children 
objects which appeared to be different from what they really were – a container of candies 
which did not contain candy, and a sponge that looked like a rock. Even when children had 
recent experience of holding a false-belief themselves, their performance was similar to that 
seen with unexpected transfer tasks. 
Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001) examined a large proportion of the ToM research 
published prior to January 1998. They performed a meta-analysis of 591 conditions in 178 
studies reported in 77 papers or reports, utilising the proportion of false-belief questions 
answered correctly as the dependent variable. They found that children 3 years and 5 months 
of age or younger performed at a below chance level. Of note, these young children made a 
characteristic error in unexpected transfer tasks – they predicted that the agent would search 
for the object they desired in the location that the object currently was, rather than where the 
agent believed it to be. Performance on false-belief tasks improves rapidly with age from 3 
years and 5 months of age onward. At about four years of age children answer false belief 
questions correctly at a level above chance.  
Wellman, Cross, and Watson (2001) also found that methodological variants of the 
standard false-belief task that attempt to elevate young children’s performance—emphasizing 
the deliberate attempt to deceive the agent in the scenario, having participants transform or 
relocate the object in the scenario, removing the target object from the scene when the test 
question was asked, emphasizing the mental state of the agent—had little effect. One 
variable, the presence of a temporal marker in the question, was found to interact with the age 
of children assessed. A temporal marker in a question served to emphasise the time frame 
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involved in the scenario (e.g., asking ‘where will the agent look first for the chocolate?’) The 
presence of a temporal marker improved performance in children four years and older, but 
did not improve performance in children younger than four years. However, younger children 
were not helped by the presence of a temporal marker. Wellman et al. argued that their meta-
analysis supported the long-standing developmental view which held that ToM research 
findings reflect a discontinuous change in children’s ToM understanding occurring at 
approximately four years of age in a typically developing child.  
Full (Early-Developing) ToM Account 
Some researchers believe that the demands of the classic false-belief task—requiring 
verbal ability, the ability to inhibit prepotent responses which assume that a person’s belief is 
true, and working memory to hold relevant aspects of the scenario in mind—obscure possible 
evidence of full-blown ToM understanding in younger children (e.g., Baillargeon, Scott, & 
He, 2010; Bloom & German, 2000; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). They argue that it is possible that 
young children have developed a theory of mind, or perhaps possess an innate and early-
developing understanding of ToM, but that the standard false-belief task is not a sufficiently 
precise tool to reveal this understanding in younger children.  The failure of younger children 
on false-belief tasks may result from limited information processing ability rather than 
limited understanding of belief. In an attempt to reduce some of the additional demands 
placed upon children in false-belief tasks, experimental paradigms were devised to assess 
false-belief ToM understanding without requiring explicit responses from younger children.  
Clements and Perner (1994) were the first to investigate whether young children 
showed implicit understanding of ToM prior to the development of explicit understanding. In 
an unexpected-transfer false-belief task, children’s eye gazing was videotaped and analysed 
to see where they looked in anticipation of an agent’s actions. They showed children a 
scenario in which a mouse could exit its house by one of two tunnels. A piece of cheese was 
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placed by the mouse in a box next to one of the tunnels. That mouse then went inside his 
house for a rest. Whilst resting, another mouse came and moved the cheese to a second box 
adjacent to the other tunnel exit. Waking from his rest, the first mouse felt hungry, and stated 
that he would go and get his cheese. The experimenter then triggered children’s anticipatory 
looking by wondering aloud where the mouse would look for his cheese. It was found that 
children aged from 2 years and 5 months of age to 2 years and 10 months of age looked at the 
present location of the cheese, even though the mouse had not witnessed the object’s transfer 
from the location where he had placed his cheese, and thus held a false-belief about its 
location. However, about 90% of children from 2 years and 11 months to 4 years and 5 
months of age looked towards the now-empty location where the mouse falsely-believed the 
object to be. Children were also asked for their explicit prediction of where the mouse would 
look for the cheese. Only 45% of the children in the older age bracket, 90% of whom had 
looked in anticipation at the now-empty location, were able to explicitly answer that the 
mouse would look for the cheese in the now-empty box where he had put it before going to 
sleep. Clements and Perner carefully and modestly interpreted the dissociation between gaze 
anticipations and verbal predictions as demonstrating that young children possess an implicit 
understanding of ToM which precedes the development of explicit understanding. 
Furthermore, they suggested that this implicit understanding develops abruptly at about 2 
years and 11 months of age. 
Ruffman, Garnham, Import, and Connolly (2001) sought to clarify the phenomena of 
3-year-olds giving incorrect explicit responses whilst simultaneously showing correct eye 
gaze. They gave children ten counters, and asked them to ‘bet’ the counters on which location 
they thought a story protagonist would go to. When children bet correctly, the experimenter 
would double the number of counters bet. When they bet incorrectly, the counters bet would 
be lost. Betting counters is an explicit measure of ToM, but the measure is not dichotomous – 
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children have the opportunity to indicate the confidence with which they understand the 
situation through betting a proportion of their counters on each outcome, indicating lesser or 
greater certainty. Children could bet a few of their counters on a second location if they 
thought that the agent in the story might go to a certain location. Children were tested with 
both a true- and false-belief task in which a protagonist’s return to one of two possible 
locations was anticipated. Direction of eye gaze and explicit verbal predictions were 
recorded, and children were asked to put their counters next to the location that they believed 
the agent would return to, or if they were unsure, to split their counters between the two 
possible locations. Children showed correct anticipatory looking (AL) at a younger age than 
they were able to make correct explicit predictions. In the true belief task, children of all ages 
bet nine or more of their counters on the true belief location. However, in the false-belief 
task, a different pattern of results was obtained. Younger children who demonstrated correct 
anticipatory looking but incorrect verbal predictions were very confident about their incorrect 
verbal prediction, with almost all of these children betting ten counters on the incorrect 
location. Young children were genuinely not conscious of their anticipatory responses.  Older 
children who failed with explicit predictions were slightly less confident than the younger 
children, but still bet on average about eight of their counters on the incorrect location. 
Younger children who passed the explicit verbal prediction question were the least certain of 
their knowledge, betting on average only about six counters on the correct location. Older 
children who passed the explicit question were more confident, betting on average eight of 
their ten counters on the correct location. Children who failed with explicit predictions on the 
false-belief task were the most confident in their answers. Younger children who passed the 
false-belief task were the least confident in their knowledge, but gains in confidence were 
seen with increasing age. Ruffman et al. carefully suggested that the differences between 
implicit and explicit responses reflected children’s possession of different kinds of 
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knowledge. Anticipatory looking requires only a representation of a fact, whereas explicit 
responses require making a judgement about that fact. 
Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) investigated 2-year-old children’s anticipatory 
looking using an ingenious non-verbal paradigm. They familiarised children to a situation 
where an agent reached through one of two windows into a box to get a desired toy. Just prior 
to the agent reaching through the window, a light would flash and a chime would sound. 
After two familiarisation trials, children looked in anticipation towards one of the two 
locations when the light and sound cue occurred. The false-belief scene involved a puppet 
bear moving a desired toy whilst the agent was distracted. The bear removed the toy from the 
scene entirely, so that if children were using a rule such as ‘ignorance leads to error’, then 
random anticipatory looking should be expected, as both locations were empty, and thus 
incorrect. Children’s eye gaze was analysed. It was found that children reliably looked in 
anticipation to the location that they would expect the agent to reach to if they attributed a 
false-belief to the agent. Adopting a rich interpretation, Southgate et al. argued that this 
showed that 2-year-olds already possessed core ToM understanding, and that this was 
inconsistent with accounts which posited a conceptual change in children’s understanding of 
false-belief at 4 years of age. They suggested that Clements and Perner’s (1994) results, in 
which they failed to find evidence of implicit ToM understanding in children younger than 
two years and eleven months of age, may have been affected by the use of the word ‘where’ 
in the prompt. Specifically, they suggested that young children may prematurely interpret the 
word ‘where’ in the question ‘where will the person look for their toy?’ as referring to the 
location in which the toy is currently, rather than the agent’s (false) belief about the toy.  
The case against conceptual change, however, was famously buoyed by Onishi and 
Baillargeon’s (2005) report of false-belief ToM understanding in 15-month-old infants. They 
developed a false-belief task which did not require children to use verbal skills in order to 
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respond. Using an unexpected-transfer task, they showed infants scenarios in which an actor 
held a false-belief, and recorded the duration of children’s eye gazing. They found that 
children as young as 15 months looked longer at scenarios in which the agent acted in 
violation of her false-belief, reaching for a desired toy in a location to which the toy had been 
moved without the agent’s knowledge, rather than reaching for the toy in the location where 
the agent left it. Onishi and Baillargeon interpreted these results as evidence that 15-month-
olds possessed a representational theory of mind, albeit possibly only in an implicit form.  
Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) interpretation of their results are controversial and 
have been challenged. Perner and Ruffman (2005) suggested three other possible 
explanations for the results found which did not require possession of a theory of mind. One 
possible explanation was that the looking times may reflect an association bias – that the 
children looked longer at new combinations of agent-object-location associations in the test 
phase as they had not seen them before, and thus more time was needed for cognitive 
processing. Another possible explanation was that children may believe that ignorance on the 
part of an agent leads to errors in their actions. The third possibility raised was that children 
deployed rules about how people behave to understand others’ actions (e.g., people look for 
objects where they last saw them), and the longer looking times reflect children’s surprise at 
the violation of behaviour rules.  
Ruffman, Taumoepeau, and Perkins (2012) argued that all ToM tasks confound 
mental state understanding and knowledge of behaviour. They noted that children’s learning 
abilities are underlain by domain-general statistical learning abilities. Ruffman et al. argued 
that children’s social experiences in the world guide them in generating predictions about the 
likelihood of given behaviours in given circumstances, and that it is possible that the 
violation of these probabilistic expectations about how people or agents will behave is 
responsible for longer looking times in implicit ToM paradigms. They note that early insights 
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into people’s likely behaviours in a sense implicitly tap mental state understanding because 
they are based on causal relationships between people and their environment which are 
underpinned by mental states, but this does not mean that children have knowledge of mental 
states. They suggest that one way in which children learn about mental states is through 
parents’ use of mental-state terms with their children in everyday conversations, driving 
children to relate such terms to their own inner experiences. Parents may also use the same 
mental-state term across a number of different contexts, providing a rich database for children 
to infer what the underlying similarity in the different contexts is likely to be. Children may 
also use their experience of the probability of different behaviours being enacted, rather than 
a more rigid deployment of rules about behaviour, to make sense of their environment and the 
actions of agents within that environment. 
The behaviour rules/probabilities interpretation has not proved easy to rule out, and 
there is an on-going debate between advocates of the ‘behaviour-rules’ account and advocates 
of the ‘early-ToM-understanding’ account. Proponents of early ToM understanding continue 
to insist that innate sensitivity to beliefs is a more parsimonious explanation for infants’ 
looking behaviour (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; He, Bolz, & Baillargeon, 2011; Scott & 
Baillargeon, 2009) than the behaviour-rules explanation, which requires that children have a 
rule for a multitude of different scenarios. Proponents of a behaviour rules explanation have 
replied that behaviour-rule following is more parsimonious, because it does not require the 
additional step of inferring an intervening mental state between situation and action (Low & 
Perner, 2012; Low & Wang, 2011; Perner, 2010; Wang, Low, Jing, & Qinghua, 2012). 
Ultimately, appeals to parsimony are not sufficient to settle the question of how differences 
between children’s spontaneous looking responses and children’s direct verbal responses are 
to be regarded.  
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Minimal-ToM (2-systems) Account 
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) suggested that differences between children’s implicit 
and explicit responses to ToM tasks may reflect the possession of not one but two 
mindreading systems (i.e. a 2-systems account). The two systems allow for a balance to be 
reached between the competing demands of flexibility and efficiency when predicting others’ 
behaviour. For example, a quick and efficient ToM system would be useful when attempting 
to predict others’ actions in very short time periods, as might occur when a player fakes a 
pass to deceive their opponent whilst playing a sport. In this situation, reasoning must be 
quick and efficient in order to respond appropriately to the other player’s subsequent actions. 
When adults engage in speculation or debate about the reason(s) for another person’s 
action(s), such as might occur, for example, in a courtroom setting, they utilise flexible but 
more time-consuming and cognitively demanding ToM reasoning. This flexible reasoning 
includes but is not limited to: (a) the representation and negotiation of complex causal 
reasoning in which an agent’s mental states (beliefs, desires, perceptions) lead them to 
assume intentions, which in turn guide the agent’s actions – with these mental states 
potentially interacting in coherent, yet essentially unbounded ways; (b) the utilisation of 
abductive reasoning – inference to the best explanation – when there are few restrictions as to 
what can be inferred to comprise relevant evidence in relation to another person or agent’s 
belief; (c) reporting explanations for others’ behaviour which comprise propositional attitudes 
and a that-clause sentence (e.g., ‘the person believes that…’) (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). 
The contradictory demands of efficiency and flexibility on cognition and time suggest that 
exploration of a 2-systems account may prove fruitful.  
Under the 2-systems account, a flexible mindreading system underlies explicit verbal 
reasoning. This system ascribes desires and beliefs to other people and emerges from about 4-
years of age. Its emergence is scaffolded by development of language, executive function, 
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and meta-representational abilities (Apperly, 2011; Low, 2010; Wang et al., 2012). 
Anticipatory looking responses are guided by an efficient implicit mindreading system that is 
shared by infants, children and adults; however, this system is limited in being set to only 
compute simple relations between objects and agents. These low-level ascriptions involve, 
but need not be restricted to, tracking an agent’s encountering and registration of objects as 
causally guiding any actions that an agent undertakes in relation to the object (Butterfill & 
Apperly, 2013). An agent encounters an object when it enters his sensory field, and registers 
an object as being in the location where it was recently encountered. Unless the agent 
subsequently encounters the object in a different location, he will act as if the object is in the 
location where he has registered it as being. Keeping track of whether an agent encountered 
an object, and whether or not his registration of the object is correct at the current time, serve 
as efficient proxies for desire and belief respectively, without requiring the cognitive 
demands of representing mental states as such. Tracking registration as a belief-like state may 
explain infant’s spontaneous responses in some false-belief tasks (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2005) which involve relationships between objects, locations, and agents. The 2-systems 
account is predicated on the suggestion that flexibility in representing propositional attitudes 
such as desires and beliefs is sacrificed in order to achieve cognitive economy in the minimal 
system. 
Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) 2-systems account also hypothesises that the minimal 
efficient mindreading system is limited in respect of content and psychological role. One of 
the ways in which the minimal system’s limitations in regard to content may manifest is in 
relation to the identity of an object.  The minimal system may not be able to represent 
different ways of thinking about the same object. Low and Watts (2013) illustrated this point 
by contrasting a full-blown belief and a minimal-ToM account of a scenario in which an 
agent has a dual identity. In the world of DC Comics, the most famous inhabitant of the 
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fictional city of Metropolis is the superhero Superman, whose alter-ego is Clark Kent. Clark’s 
colleague Lois Lane is unaware that Clark is Superman. If (1) Lois believes that Clark is in a 
restaurant and (2) Clark is Superman, should it follow that (3) Lois believes that Superman is 
in the restaurant? In a belief account, the inference that Lois believes Superman is in the 
restaurant is invalid: Lois does not know that Clark is Superman. Under a minimal-ToM 
system, where an agent’s registrations are tracked, the scenario is as follows: (1) Lois 
registers Clark-in-restaurant; (2) Clark is Superman; (3) Lois registers Superman-in-
restaurant. As registration is a relation to objects rather than to beliefs (Butterfill & Apperly, 
2013), the inference is valid without ascribing a belief to Lois.  Someone who represents Lois 
registering Clark-in-restaurant will not understand why Lois would look elsewhere if 
searching for Superman, as the registration of Clark-in-restaurant is equivalent to the 
registration of Superman-in-restaurant. A person using the more flexible but cognitively 
demanding system for representing beliefs as such would understand that it is possible to 
think about a single person (Clark) in different ways (Superman), and so may understand why 
Lois, despite knowing where Clark is, might look elsewhere when searching for Superman.  
Low and Watts (2013) investigated signature limits to efficiently tracking registration 
as a belief-like state in relation to children and adults’ implicit responses to an object-identity 
false-belief task. Three- and four-year-old children and adults watched an identity task which 
took place in two phases. In the familiarisation phase, people saw two boxes sitting on a 
table. The boxes lifted, and it was revealed that underneath the left-side box was a red toy, 
and underneath the right-side box, a blue toy.  An agent then entered the scene and observed 
each toy travel to the opposite box. Windows above the boxes lit up as a chime sounded, and 
the agent reached for the box in which the blue toy was located. The purpose of the 
familiarisation phase was to inform the study participants that the agent in the scenario has a 
preference for one colour over another, in this case for blue over red. In the second, belief-
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induction phase, participants watched the agent observe a toy that appeared to the participants 
to be a red toy travel from the left- to the right-side box. Out of view of the agent, but visible 
to the participants, the toy spun around to reveal that its other side was coloured blue. The toy 
then returned to the left-side box, this time with its red aspect facing the agent and blue aspect 
facing the study participants. If the study participants are spontaneously making attributions 
about the agent’s belief as such, they should understand that the agent believes that a blue toy 
remained in the right-side box, and a red toy was located in the left-side box. The accuracy of 
participants’ implicit eye gaze responses was assessed, and explicit verbal predictions were 
elicited as to which box the agent would reach to. An unexpected-transfer false-belief task 
was also administered to the same children to assess their implicit eye gaze responses to 
tracking agent-object relations. Children and adults displayed correct anticipatory looking on 
the object-location task, but not on the object-identity task. Children’s explicit responses 
showed a developing flexibility with age. On the location test, 31% of 3-year-olds, 75% of 4-
year-olds, and 100% of adults made correct verbal predictions. On the identity test, 13% of 3-
year-olds, 56% of 4-year-olds, and 95% of adults made correct verbal predictions. The 
pattern of young children’s implicit eye gaze allowing them to respond correctly to an object 
location false-belief but not an object identity false-belief tasks fits with the expectation that 
the minimal mindreading system has signature limits. 
A person’s belief is not the only driving force behind their behaviour. They must also 
hold a desire to achieve a certain state of affairs. Beliefs and desires interact to explain 
thoughts and actions (Apperly, 2011). In the classic paradigm of the object-location false-
belief task, Maxi desires to find the chocolate. This desire for the chocolate, combined with 
Maxi’s false-belief about the chocolate’s location, gives him a subjective reason for looking 
in the cupboard where he believes the chocolate to be. Given that desires and beliefs play 
interdependent roles in driving and justifying an agent’s actions, and that the demands upon 
PRE-SCHOOLERS’ REASONING  18 
 
cognition required by mindreading attitudes such as intentions and desires are analogous to 
those required for mindreading beliefs, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) suggested that the 
minimal efficient mindreading system may also be limited in respect of its ability to represent 
psychological roles. Thus, a person who only tracks beliefs by processing registrations may 
not appreciate a situation in which an agent wishes to avoid rather than approach an object. If 
children’s indirect implicit responses, when compared with their explicit understanding, also 
turn out to show limits on understanding how beliefs can interact with desires, then it can be 
concluded that the minimal system involves a form of cognition that does not rely upon 
features of full-blown belief representation as compared to the flexible system. 
Approach and Avoidance 
Traditional false-belief tasks utilised an approach paradigm – the agent invariably 
desires an object. Cassidy (1998) investigated whether 3- to 5-year-old children take an 
agent’s desire into account when reasoning about ToM. She utilised both approach (the agent 
wants the object) and avoidance (the agent does not want the object) scenarios. Children were 
introduced to a puppet and shown three different types of food – the puppet’s favourite food 
(desired), a food the puppet thought was ‘ok’ (neutral food), and a food that the puppet hated 
to eat (not desired). Two unexpected transfer scenarios were then shown. Children were told 
they would play a game with the puppet. The puppet had to hide its food in one of two hiding 
places. Whichever hiding place the puppet chose, it would have to eat the food in that 
location. In one trial, the puppet took their favourite food and hid it in one of two hiding 
places. The puppet left the room, and the experimenter and child participant moved the 
puppet’s favourite food to the other location. The puppet returned, and the child was asked 
which hiding place the puppet would pick. In the second trial, the process was repeated, only 
this time with the food the puppet hated. Pilot work had shown children disliked pointing to 
an empty box. For this reason, on both trials the neutral food was placed with the desired or 
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undesired food in the initial location and not moved, meaning that when children were asked 
to choose a location both locations had food in them. Cassidy found that 4-year-old children 
who successfully passed the false-belief task in the desired-food scenario did not perform 
better than chance in the undesired food scenario, despite correctly identifying the location 
the undesired food was in. Cassidy suggested one possible explanation for the results 
obtained was that the necessity of combining the calculation of the agent’s false belief and 
the calculation of the behaviour necessary to satisfy the desire to avoid the disliked food 
overwhelmed children’s cognitive resources.   
Building on Cassidy’s (1998) work, Leslie and Polizzi (1998) suggested that the 
differing explicit prediction performances of three- and four-year-old children in false-belief 
tasks may result from differences in executive functioning abilities – in particular, differences 
in the ability to inhibit prepotent responses. They suggested that people have a default 
attribution - that the other person holds a true-belief - in regard to other people’s belief(s). In 
order to demonstrate understanding of a false-belief, the person being assessed must first 
inhibit their initial default response, based on the assumption that the other person’s belief is 
true, in order to search for an alternative explanation for the other person’s actions – in this 
case, that the other person holds a false-belief. This view assumes that failure to successfully 
inhibit the initial assumption that the other person has a true-belief is responsible for young 
children’s poor explicit prediction performance on false-belief tasks. They further suggested 
that in order to understand an avoidance paradigm (in which the agent does not want an 
object, but in effect desires to avoid the location in which the object is present), a person must 
first attend to the location of the object to be avoided, and then inhibit that location and 
switch their attention to the second location, where the object to be avoided is not located. 
Thus a successful explicit prediction of an agent’s actions in an avoidance paradigm in a 
false-belief task requires a double inhibition, the inhibition of the assumption of true-belief, 
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and the inhibition of the location where the object to be avoided is currently, in order to select 
the location where the object is not. Leslie and Polizzi (1998) noted that the two inhibitions 
cannot simply be summed, as this would produce the incorrect answer. Rather, the two 
inhibitions must interact in order to cancel each other out. Thus a task involving double 
inhibition would be considerably more difficult than a task involving single inhibition.  
To investigate their hypothesis about the role of inhibition in ToM understanding, 
Leslie and Polizzi (1998) utilised an avoidance paradigm in conjunction with a false-belief 
unexpected-transfer task. They tested 4-year-olds who had succeeded in a false-belief task in 
an approach scenario. Children were presented with a scenario in which a girl, Renee, does 
not want to put a piece of fish in the same box as her sick pet kitten, who is resting in one of 
two boxes in the scene. In the false-belief condition the sick kitten crawls from one box to the 
other whilst Renee is absent retrieving the piece of fish. In the true-belief condition, Renee 
retrieves the piece of fish and returns to witness the kitten crawl from one box to the other. 
Upon Renee’s return, children were asked where Renee thinks (false-belief) or knows (true-
belief) the kitten is, and to predict which box Renee will go to with the fish. The think/know 
question required that children consider only Renee’s belief. The prediction question required 
that children consider both Renee’s belief and her (negative) desire (to avoid placing the fish 
in the same box as the kitten). 6% of children in the true belief and 11% of children in the 
false-belief condition failed the think/know question which required a single inhibition. A 
double inhibition was required to successfully answer the prediction question, which required 
children to also take into account Renee’s (negative) desire to avoid placing the piece of fish 
in the same box as the sick kitten. When a false-belief was coupled with a negative desire, 
four-year-olds performed poorly. 62% of children failed the prediction question. Leslie and 
Polizzi noted that this was a considerably larger failure rate than would be expected if a 
double inhibition was simply the sum of two single inhibitions, in which case a failure rate of 
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17% would have been expected. They concluded that the findings supported their inhibition 
hypothesis, and thus supported the information processing account of differences in three- 
and four-year-olds performance in false-belief tasks – that earlier possession of understanding 
of ToM is masked in younger children by executive function demands.  
The Current Study 
The current study utilises an approach and an avoidance scenario to assess young 
children’s implicit and explicit ToM understanding in a false-belief unexpected-transfer task. 
An agent wants to put away his toy rabbit, and has a choice of two boxes, one of which 
already contains a toy snake. In the positive-desire or approach scenario, the agent wants to 
place the rabbit in the box with the snake, as the two toys are friends. In the negative-desire 
or avoidance scenario, the agent does not want to put the rabbit in the box which the snake is 
in, as the rabbit is afraid of the snake. The agent holds a false-belief about the location of the 
snake, which has been unexpectedly transferred to the other box whilst the agent was 
distracted. The full (early-developing) ToM account would suggest a certain pattern of results 
– that implicit responses would be accurate across approach and avoidance scenarios. 
Following Low and Watts’ (2013) minimal (2-systems) ToM account, it is hypothesised that 
young children’s implicit understanding of ToM would allow them to track facts about other 
people approaching objects, but would not allow them to track facts about other people 
avoiding objects. Thus, it is expected that children’s anticipatory eye gazing will be accurate 
in approach scenarios, but not in avoidance scenarios.  
Method 
Participants 
 Forty 3-year-olds (25 males, 15 females; M = 42.63 months, SD = 3.35, age range = 
36-47 months) and forty 4-year-olds (22 males, 18 females; M = 54.25 months; SD = 3.30, 
age range = 49-59 months) from six local kindergartens participated in the study. Information 
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letters and consent forms (Appendix A) were sent to the parents of all children at the 
participating kindergartens. Informed parental consent was obtained and only those children 
with parental consent were invited to take part. Children also provided assent prior to taking 
part. Ethics approval for the study was granted by the School of Psychology Human Ethics 
Committee under delegated authority from the Victoria University of Wellington’s Human 
Ethics Committee. Participants spoke English and were interviewed individually at their 
kindergarten. Forty participants were randomly assigned to the approach (positive-desire) 
condition and forty participants to the avoidance (negative-desire) condition.  
Materials 
 The approach and avoidance false-belief unexpected-transfer tasks were recorded in 
digital video format and edited before being shown as a film to participants on a 22-inch 
television monitor. A video camera was used to record the direction of participants’ eye-
gazing. A remote control was used to start and pause the film as required. In the films an 
agent wearing a plain blue shirt and a white visor sat behind two tables which were arranged 
so that a small gap ran between them from left to right across the scene. On the table, located 
to either side of the agent, were two boxes (one blue, one green, with brown lids). Both boxes 
opened on the side closest to the agent, allowing him to reach inside. A black panel with strop 
light sat on top of each box. A telephone was situated on a stand behind the agent. The toys 
used in the familiarisation phases were a small multi-coloured rugby ball, a toy car, a toy 
train and a toy teapot. In the test phase, the toys used were a white rabbit hand-puppet, a pink 
pig hand-puppet and a plush green toy snake. 
Procedure 
 Each participant watched a film of either an approach or an avoidance scenario on a 
22-inch television monitor in a quiet room at their local kindergarten. Each scenario 
comprised two familiarisation trials and one belief-induction trial. Participants were 
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interviewed individually by an experimenter. A high-definition video camera placed behind 
and above the television monitor was trained on children’s faces to record their anticipatory 
looking.  
The approach scenario task comprised two familiarisation trials and one belief-
induction trial (see Figure 1). In the first familiarisation trial, children saw an agent introduce 
himself, saying “Hi, my name is Jason, and this is my toy”. The agent wore a white visor so 
that his eyes were obscured. He was seated at a desk with a box on either side, holding a toy 
on the desk in front of him. Then the black panel on top of both boxes flashed with a beep 
sound.  In response to the light and sound cue, the agent said, “that means it’s time to put the 
toy away’. He opened one of two different coloured boxes located to either side of him, and 
pulled out a toy from inside the box. He said, “There is a toy in this box. Toys should go 
together.” He then replaced the toy he had removed from the box and closed the box, before 
reaching across to the other box, opening it, and observing aloud said, “And this box is 
empty”. He then closed that box. The light and sound cue occurred again, and the agent said, 
“That’s right, I still have to put the toy away”. The agent reached for and opened the first box 
which had a toy inside, and placed the toy which was sitting on the desk in front of him into 
the box, which he then closed. 
The second familiarisation trial followed the same order of events, but with different 
toys on the desk in front of the agent and inside the boxes, and with the agent reaching to the 
opposite box from that he reached for first in the first familiarisation trial. The purpose of the 
familiarisation trials was to teach children that the light and sound cue signalled to the agent 
that it was time to put his toy away. All participants showed correct first look anticipations in 
the second familiarisation trial. Since participants were familiar with the cue, it should trigger 
their anticipatory looking (AL) in the test trial.  
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Figure 1. Familiarisation and belief-induction trials in the approach (positive desire) false-
belief task.  
The familiarisation trials in the avoidance scenario (see Figure 2) followed a similar 
procedure to the familiarisation trials in the approach scenario. The scenarios diverged when 
the agent (the same actor, Jason) opened the first box. He pulled out a toy, said “This box is 
full”, replaced the toy, and closed the box. He then reached across to the other box, opened it, 
observed “And this box is empty’, and then closed that box. The cue occurred, and the agent 
stated, “That’s right, I still have to put the toy away’. He then placed the toy in the empty 
box. The second familiarisation trial followed the same series of events, but with different 
toys, and with the empty box located on the opposite side from the first familiarisation trial.  
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Figure 2. Familiarisation and belief-induction trials in the avoidance (negative desire) false-
belief task. 
All participants who participated in the avoidance condition also showed correct first look 
anticipations in the second familiarisation trial. 
Belief-induction trial. A belief-induction test trial followed the familiarisation trials 
in both conditions (see Figures 1 and 2). This was the important scenario in terms of 
differentiating the full-ToM account from the minimal-ToM account. Two effectively 
identical versions of the belief-induction trial were filmed for both the approach and 
avoidance scenarios allowing for counterbalancing of target locations. The belief-induction 
trial began with the agent once more seated at the desk, this time holding a hand-puppet 
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rabbit on his right hand. The agent re-introduced himself saying ‘Hi, my name is Jason, and 
this is my rabbit’ (and the rabbit’s head moved from side to side). The light-and-sound cue 
occurred, and the agent reached for one of the boxes, opened it, and pulled out a toy snake.  
 Approach (positive-desire) condition. In the approach scenario the agent said 
‘There’s a snake in here. This is the rabbit’s friend. The rabbit wants to be with his friend’. 
As he said ‘the rabbit wants to be with his friend’, the rabbit’s paw was made to wave at the 
snake. The agent replaced the snake in its box, closed the box, and reached across to the other 
box and opened it. He noted, “And this box is empty”, and then closed the second box. At 
this point a telephone which was located on a stand behind the agent rang, and the agent 
turned around so that he was facing away from the desk. The agent picked up the telephone, 
said hello, and appeared to listen to a conversation. Whilst he was engaged with the telephone 
and facing away from the scene, a hand-puppet pig rose up through a gap in the middle of the 
desk. The pig opened the box in which the snake was located, opened the empty box, 
transferred the snake to the empty box, closed that box, closed the first box, and left the 
scene. At that point, the agent said “OK, bye”, and then hung up the telephone and turned 
back to face the desk. As such, the agent did not witness the transfer of the snake. The cue 
then occurred. The critical issue is where children would anticipate the agent reaching 
towards to put the rabbit away. During the first 1,750-ms following the light-and-sound cue, 
analyses focused on determining whether participants showed AL to the left- or right-side 
box (first-look direction and looking duration were measured; Low, 2010; Low & Watts, 
2013).  
 Avoidance (negative-desire) condition. The avoidance scenario was effectively 
identical to the approach scenario except as follows. When the agent opened the box in the 
avoidance scenario, he said, “There’s a snake in here! The rabbit is afraid of the snake! I 
don’t want to put the rabbit in with the snake because that will make the rabbit more scared”. 
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As he said ‘the rabbit is afraid of the snake. I don’t want to put the rabbit in with the snake 
because that will make the rabbit more scared’ the rabbit was animated such that it turned to 
face the agent and was visibly shaking and trembling until the agent replaced the snake in its 
box and closed the box.  
 Questions. To ensure that the participants followed the scenario, the film was paused 
at certain moments and each participant was asked control story memory questions. After the 
agent opened the box and explained that ‘the rabbit was friends-with or afraid-of the snake’ 
the experimenter asked, “Does Jason want to put the rabbit in with the snake?”. If the 
participant answered incorrectly the experimenter would correct the child, stating either “Yes 
– Jason wants to put the rabbit in with the snake because the rabbit and the snake are best 
friends” (approach condition) or “No – Jason does not want to put the rabbit in with the snake 
because that will make the rabbit more scared” (avoidance condition). The experimenter then 
asked the participant to “Point to which box the snake is inside”. Again, if the child indicated 
the incorrect box, the experimenter would correct the child, indicating the correct box. After 
the unexpected transfer of the snake by the pig, the child was asked to “Point to which box 
the snake is now inside”. If a child answered incorrectly he or she was informed of the correct 
answer. Only 1 participant (a 3-year-old in the avoidance condition) had to be corrected when 
answering where the snake (after the unexpected transfer) was located.  
At the end of the film, after the 1750-ms AL time-window, children were asked two 
test questions: a think question “Point to which box Jason thinks the snake is inside” and a 
prediction question “Point to which box Jason will put the rabbit in”.  
Coding. Two raters coded 25% of AL recordings during the first 1,750-ms following 
the illumination-sound cue in the belief-induction trials for both conditions. The coding was 
done by playing back each recording in slow-motion and scoring gaze direction on a frame-
by-frame basis (looking times were accurate to 0.04-s; 25 frames/s) using the Avidemux 2.5 
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programme (Low, 2010). Raters agreed 100% of the time as to whether or not participants 
looked first and looked more to the correct location. One of the raters then coded the 
remaining recordings.  
Results 
The percentages of participants showing accurate first-look anticipations, and accurate 
predictions on the think and action questions by age group (3- and 4-year-olds) and condition 
(negative vs. positive desires) are summarised in Figure 3. Across both the approach and 
avoidance conditions accurate explicit verbal responses increased as a function of age for 
both the think and prediction prompts. There were no gender-related effects. 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of participants showing accurate first-look anticipations, and accurate 
predictions on the think and action questions by age group (3- and 4-year-olds) and condition 
(negative vs. positive desires). 
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In the approach task, 15 of 20 3-year-olds (75%) and 15 of 20 4-year-olds (75%) 
demonstrated first look anticipations towards the correct location – for each age group, a 
greater percentage of correct first looks than would be expected by chance (binomial test, ps 
< .05). In the avoidance task, performance in correct anticipatory looking was poorer. Only 9 
of 20 3-year-olds (45%) and 6 of 20 4-year-olds (30%) demonstrated anticipatory looking 
toward the correct location in the test trial of the avoidance task, neither better nor worse than 
would be expected by chance (binomial test, ps > .05). 
Duration of anticipatory looking was also analysed—based on a differential looking 
score—over the 1,750 millisecond window following the light and sound cue in the belief-
induction trial for each participant (Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). The DLS 
(ranging from -1 to +1) is a measure of preference for looking to one target location over 
another, and was calculated by subtracting total looking time to the incorrect window from 
total looking time to the correct window and then dividing by the sum of looking time to the 
correct and incorrect windows. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on 
participants’ DLS, with the valence of desire (approach condition vs. avoidance condition) 
and age group (3- vs. 4-year-olds) as between-subjects factors. There was no significant main 
effect of age group (F(1, 76) = 0.49, p > .05). There was a significant main effect of valence 
condition (F(1, 76) = 17.95, p < .001; ηp
2
 = .191). On average, participants looked longer to 
the correct location in the approach condition and looked longer to the incorrect location in 
the avoidance condition (M = 261-ms vs. M = -286-ms). The age group by valence condition 
interaction was not significant (F(1, 76) = 0.19, p > .05). 
As indicated in Figure 3, there were age-related changes in 3- and 4-year-olds 
performances on the explicit prediction test questions. In the avoidance condition 7/20 (35%) 
3-year-olds responded correctly to the think question, and 16/20 (80%) 4-year-olds responded 
correctly, χ2(1, N = 40) = 8.29, p < .05. For the prediction question 9/20 (45%) 3-year-olds 
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responded correctly, and 17/20 4-year-olds responded correctly (85%), χ2(1, N = 40) = 7.03, p 
< .05. In the approach condition, 25% of 3-year-olds responded correctly to the think 
question, and 85% of 4-year-olds responded correctly, χ2(1, N = 40) = 14.55, p < .05). In 
response to the prediction question, 40% of 3-year-olds made accurate predictions, and 75% 
of 4-year-olds made accurate predictions, χ2(1,N = 40) = 5.01, p < .05. 
Across age groups, performances across the think and prediction questions were 
significantly correlated in the avoidance condition (r = 0.61, p < .001; N = 40) and in the 
approach condition (r = 0.34, p < .05; N = 40). Significant inter-relationships between 
performance on the think and prediction questions remained in the avoidance condition even 
when individual differences associated with age were removed (rpartial = 0.56, p < .001, df = 
37). There was no significant age-partialled correlation between children’s performance in 
the think and prediction questions in the approach condition (rpartial = 0.16, p > .05, df = 37). 
Three-year-olds’ anticipatory first looks and verbal predictions in the avoidance 
condition were not significantly associated for either the think prompt (Wilcoxon Z = -0.632, 
p > .05) or the prediction prompt (Wilcoxon Z = 0.00, p > .05). However, four year olds 
displayed a significant dissociation between anticipatory looking and verbal predictions in the 
avoidance condition for both the think prompt and the prediction prompt. For the think 
prompt, 55% of 4-year-olds gave accurate verbal predictions despite anticipatory looking to 
the incorrect side (Wilcoxon Z = -2.887, p < .01). For the prediction prompt, 60% of 4-year-
olds gave accurate verbal predictions despite anticipatory looking to the incorrect side 
(Wilcoxon Z = -3.051, p < .01). 
The analyses then turned to investigate potential dissociations between the accuracy 
of participants’ first look and the accuracy of participants’ predictions on the think and 
prediction questions. For 3-year-olds in the avoidance condition, there were no significant 
dissociations between first look anticipations and direct verbal responses on the prediction 
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question, and no significant dissociations between first look anticipations and direct verbal 
responses on the think question (Wilcoxon Z test, all ps > .05). However, 3-year-olds showed 
significant dissociations in their patterns of responding in the approach condition. A 
significant number of 3-year-olds (60%; 12/20) showed the classic dissociation pattern of 
displaying accurate first looks despite giving inaccurate answers to the think question 
(Wilcoxon Z = -2.67, p < .01). Similarly, 45% of 3-year-olds (9/20) also showed the classic 
dissociation pattern of displaying accurate first looks despite giving inaccurate answers to the 
prediction question (Wilcoxon Z = -2.11, p < .05).   
With respect to the avoidance condition, 4-year-olds showed a reverse pattern of 
dissociation. A significant number of 4-year-olds (12/20; 60%) displayed incorrect first looks 
while providing accurate verbal responses to the prediction question (Wilcoxon Z = -3.06, p 
< .01). Similarly, a significant number of 4-year-olds (11/20; 55%) displayed incorrect first 
looks while providing accurate verbal responses to the prediction question (Wilcoxon Z = -
2.89, p < .01). The 4-year-olds did not show any significant pattern of dissociation in the 
approach condition (Wilcoxon Z test, all ps > .05). 
Discussion 
The full-and-early-developing ToM account predicted that there should be clear AL to 
the correct side in both the approach and the avoidance tasks, revealing children’s implicit 
ToM understanding. Following Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) 2-systems account, it was 
hypothesised that young children’s implicit understanding of ToM would allow them to track 
facts about other people approaching objects, but would not allow them to track facts about 
other people avoiding objects. Thus, it was expected that children’s AL would be accurate in 
approach scenarios, but not in avoidance scenarios. A clear side preference in AL (as 
measured by first look direction) was observed in both 3- and 4-year-olds in the approach 
task. However, no clear side preference in AL (as measured by first look direction) was 
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observed in either 3- or 4-year-olds in the avoidance task, supporting Apperly and Butterfill’s 
account. The findings indicated that an efficient mind-reading or minimal-ToM system does 
not accommodate negative desires (‘the agent does not want…’), such as the desire to avoid 
an object, but rather accommodates only positive desires (‘the agent wants…’), such as when 
an agent holds a desire to approach an object. Three- and 4-year olds were able to, as 
evidenced by their anticipatory looking (AL), accurately track facts relating to others’ beliefs 
regarding object location in situations where the other person expressed a desire to approach 
an object. However, in a task in which a person expressed a desire to avoid an object and had 
a mistaken belief about the object’s whereabouts, 3- and 4-year-olds’ AL was at chance. AL 
was accurate in approach scenarios, but in avoidance scenarios AL was at at-chance levels, 
suggesting that a minimal-ToM system was ineffective when faced with situations involving 
complex desire and belief interactions. Further mapping on Apperly and Butterfill’s 2-
systems view, explicit verbal predictions developed in step, showing an age-related increase 
in accuracy across both the approach and avoidance tasks. This suggests that explicit 
predictions are guided by a separate flexible mind-reading system. Four-year-olds were 
successful with explicit predictions across both the approach and avoidance tasks, whilst 3-
year-olds were unsuccessful. Overall, the results support the existence of a minimal-ToM 
ability as hypothesised by a 2-systems account, whilst simultaneously failing to support the 
pattern of results predicted by the full-ToM account. 
These results complement those found by Low and Watts (2013) in their investigation 
of the signature limitations hypothesised to form part of a minimal-ToM system in a 2-
systems account of ToM development. They found that AL was not accurate in a task where 
it was necessary to compute how an agent would misinterpret an identity of an agent, where 
the truth of the agent’s beliefs would result in there being more than one object in the scene 
(in reality there was only a single object; the object had a different colour on each side, a fact 
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which was known to the test participants but not to the agent in the test scenario). Children’s 
and adults’ implicit understanding allowed them to track facts involving object location but 
not object identity. Low and Watts concluded that both children and adults possess a 
minimal-ToM system which is not capable of taking object identity into account. The results 
of the current study suggest that the minimal-ToM system is even more rudimentary – it is 
not capable of considering how desires can interact complexly with beliefs. As such, the 
minimal ability to track registration as belief-like state appears to be limited to tracking an 
agent’s desire to approach an object and fails to handle an agent’s negative desire, such as the 
desire to avoid an object. 
A single-system or full-ToM account might explain the current study’s results by 
claiming that the avoidance task involves a greater degree of executive ability: more 
information processing demand may be required to calculate a negative desire as opposed to a 
positive desire. Crucially, 4-year-olds’ explicit responses in the avoidance task were correct, 
despite their AL responses showing no preference for either the correct or incorrect location. 
Moreover, single-system accounts (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010) assume that explicit but 
not implicit responses require the deployment of executive abilities. For this reason the early-
developing (innate) ToM account fails to predict the pattern of results obtained. If 
spontaneous looking responses are a more accurate and more sensitive manifestation of an 
innate ToM understanding, children (4-year-olds) should not be showing superior 
performance in their direct verbal responses as compared to their indirect AL responses. 
 Leslie and Polizzi (1998) granted a pivotal role to the process of inhibition in 
children’s early-developing ToM reasoning. They theorised that reasoning about negative 
desires in a false-belief task required a double inhibition – an inhibition of a default 
assumption of true-belief and an inhibition of the location where the non-desired object is – 
which would be significantly more taxing on executive abilities than either inhibition alone. 
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They presented two possible models of inhibitory processing in belief problems, both of 
which relied upon the subject mustering two inhibitions in order to make an accurate explicit 
prediction. In either model, failure of any of the inhibitory processes results in error. The 
think question (asked of children in the current study) required only a single inhibition – that 
of an assumption of true-belief - whereas the prediction question required the ‘double 
inhibition’ of both belief and location. Thus, Leslie and Polizzi’s double inhibition theory 
predicts that children’s performance would be (considerably) worse on the prediction than the 
think question. However, in the current study 4-year-olds correctly answered both the think 
(80% correct) and prediction (85% correct) questions in the avoidance task, with slightly 
better performance on the prediction question. When 4-year-olds were able to correctly 
answer a question about the agent’s (false) belief, they were also able to predict the agent’s 
action, even when the agent had a negative desire.  
 Four-year-olds’ explicit predictions in the avoidance task in the current study were 
accurate. These results differ from those obtained by Cassidy (1998) and Leslie and Polizzi 
(1998), who found that 4-year-olds did not pass similar false-belief avoidance tasks.  Why did 
4-year-olds pass the avoidance task in the current study whilst 4-year-olds in previous studies 
failed explicit prediction questions? One obvious answer is that the methodology of the 
current study differed from that of both Cassidy’s and Leslie and Polizzi’s studies. The 
current study used edited films to show children in each condition the same sequence of 
events. Previous studies manually re-enacted the storyline for each child, which is likely to 
have resulted in greater variability in the presentation of the task. Using an edited film 
allowed for the relevant aspects of the scene to be presented in a visually salient manner. 
Cassidy’s task required that the child remember which of three foods was desirable, neutral, 
and undesirable in the opinion of the agent. Leslie and Polizzi’s task required that children 
recall that it was detrimental to feed fish to the sick kitten – that the preferred food, 
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unusually, causes illness. Children may have had to inhibit the idea that food is beneficial. 
Steps were taken in the current study to ensure that children understood key aspects of the 
storyline through the use of control story memory questions posed at key moments. These 
questions may have assisted children by emphasising key aspects of the scenario, decreasing 
children’s reliance upon memory. They also served to highlight the reason for the agent’s 
desire, which children may have found helpful. In the avoidance task in the current study, the 
rabbit trembled at the sight of the snake, highlighting its fear. However, it is also possible that 
young children may also lack experience in viewing complex ToM scenarios and thus fail to 
pay attention to aspects of the story (such as complex belief and desire interactions) that older 
viewers pay particular attention to. It may also be possible that 4-year-olds’ success in the 
false-belief avoidance task in the current study reflects the fact that children at this age are 
capable of directly reasoning about a negative-desire false-belief task when other demands 
upon executive abilities are reduced.   
 Perner and Ruffman (2005) suggested a behaviour-rule account to explain young 
children’s accurate looking responses (and perhaps explicit predictions). A behaviour-rule 
account explains children’s accurate AL as resulting from the deployment of rules that are 
constructed from inferences based on past experiences. A behaviour rule such as ‘when 
putting toys away, people choose a location (box) where they have seen other toys’ could 
underlie children’s AL responses in the approach task. However, the lack of a clear side 
preference in the avoidance task for either 3- or 4-year-olds is not easily explained by a 
behaviour rules account. That said, children may be less likely to generate a behaviour rule 
for a situation where a person wants to avoid an object. Ruffman, Taumoepeau, and Perkins 
(2012) suggested that children may also use their experience of the probability of different 
behaviours being enacted, rather than a more rigid deployment of rules about behaviour, to 
make sense of their environment and the actions of agents within that environment. Rule-
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based inference about a positive desire can be made whenever a person moves to approach an 
object. In the context of object avoidance, there is no clear spatial link may between a person 
and the object he or she wishes to avoid, and thus rules may not be so easily inferred from 
such experiences. However, as for the Behaviour Rules explanation, the use of probabilistic 
reasoning cannot explain the pattern of results obtained, specifically why 4-year-olds in the 
avoidance task displayed incorrect AL and correct explicit predictions. Probabilistic 
reasoning should lead to either consistent success or failure across AL and explicit 
predictions, or to a pattern of correct AL and incorrect explicit predictions. Overall, though, 
children’s social-learning experiences, and the inferences about probabilities that children 
may make as a result, could still contribute to the basis of a minimal-ToM system.   
 What further evidence would strengthen the case for a signature limitation to AL with 
respect to tracking negative desires? It is important to note that the current study only tested 
3- and 4-year-old children, in whom understanding of false-belief is still developing. Further 
research should investigate whether people in other age groups also fail to display accurate 
AL in false-belief avoidance tasks. Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant, and Todd (2011) have 
already investigated the accuracy and speed of 6- to 11-year-old children and adults’ explicit 
responses to belief-desire reasoning tasks. They found that although accuracy and speed 
improved with increasing age, false-belief negative desire tasks remain more difficult for 
older children and adults than other combinations of belief and desire. This remained the case 
even when participants were explicitly told whether the agent had a true or false-belief, 
obviating the need to infer the agent’s belief. The minimal-ToM hypothesis predicts that the 
same signature limitations in AL accuracy observed in 3- and 4-year-old children will also be 
observed in older children and adults. 
 Another way that the evidence for a minimal-ToM system could be strengthened 
would be to demonstrate the existence of signature limits within-subjects. Thus, the same 
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participants could be tested on both a positive- and a negative-desire scenario. If accurate AL 
was observed in the positive-desire scenario but not in the negative-desire scenario 
consistently within-subjects, that would strengthen the case for a minimal-ToM system. 
Similarly, experiments employing a within-subjects design to reveal the extent to which 
individual children and adults show limits in implicit (AL) understanding of both false-beliefs 
over object identity and negative desires would further bolster the evidence for a minimal-
ToM system and the 2-systems account.  
 The current study demonstrates that AL is not accurate in scenarios in which an agent 
holds a negative desire, a desire to avoid rather than approach an object. This adds to the 
body of evidence which suggests that the ToM system evidenced by children’s AL has 
signature limitations, consistent with the 2-systems account proposed by Apperly and 
Butterfill (2009). Two ToM systems, one a minimal system which tracks agent-object 
relations, and the other a more complex system which is able to reason about propositional 
attitudes, provides the best solution to the competing demands for efficiency and flexibility in 
ToM tasks.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Research Study Information Sheet:  
What Young Children Understand about People’s Minds 
John Bell and Dr Jason Low 
School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
 We wish to learn about the age trends by which children come to spontaneously discover that 
other people can think differently to themselves, and that people’s thoughts and beliefs about 
the world influence behaviour (this understanding is formally known as children’s Theory of 
Mind development). We are inviting 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds to take part in this research 
project.  
 
Who is conducting the research? 
 John Bell is a student in the Clinical Psychology programme, and Dr Jason Low is a Senior 
Lecturer in Psychology. John is carrying out the research as part of his Masters thesis project. Dr 
Low is the project supervisor. This research has been approved by the School of Psychology 
Human Ethics Committee under delegated authority of Victoria University of Wellington’s 
Human Ethics Committee.  
 
What is involved if you agree to let your child participate? 
 Each child will be invited to watch a short film clip with toy puppets on a TV screen (only around 
3-minutes long). The story is about a man wanting to hide a soft-toy rabbit inside a box. In the 
story, the man sees that the green box is full (it already has a soft-toy snake in it) and that the 
blue box is suitably empty. The man says he does not want to put the toy rabbit with the toy 
snake; however whilst the man is distracted, a puppet pig comes along and secretly moves the 
toy snake from the green box to the blue box. Then the man turns around and wants to hide the 
toy rabbit. Children will be asked to predict where the man will go to hide the toy rabbit, in the 
green or blue box. We hope to learn more about the age when children start to spontaneously 
understand that the man will put the toy rabbit in the blue box because he thinks that box is 
empty and thinks that the toy snake is in the green box.  
 We will also use a camera to video-record children’s gazing whilst they are watching the film 
clips. We wish to learn if children can unconsciously sense the correct answer even if they give 
an incorrect verbal answer. So in the case of the puppet show, we wish to learn whether 
children will look first and gaze longer at the blue box if they unconsciously anticipate the man’s 
belief about where to put the toy rabbit. 
 This project will help uncover whether young children show an intuitive understanding of 
people’s thoughts and beliefs in their gazing responses compared to their verbal responses. 
 As such, the task is straight-forward and will only take around 3-minutes. All testing will take 
place at your child’s school in a quiet space that is designated and seen by your child’s teacher. 
The project will take place at times convenient to your child’s teacher.  
 You do not have to make any special attempt to get your child to think about such tasks 
beforehand as it is children’s own spontaneous responses that we are interested in. 
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 At the end of the study your child will get to collect stickers. 
 During the research you are free to withdraw your child from the study, without needing to give 
a reason, at any point before your child’s data have been collected. Your child will also be asked 
if he or she would like to take part on the day of the study itself. Your child is also free to decline 
without having to give a reason. 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
 Consent forms, video recordings and verbal response sheets will remain in Dr Low’s custody and 
kept in a locked laboratory. Consent forms will be kept separate from all other data. Once we 
have coded the duration of children’s gaze from the video recordings, all video recordings will be 
wiped. Information from the video recordings and verbal responses will be coded by number 
only. Your child will not be identified in the research project or in any presentation or 
publication. 
 The coded data may be used in other related studies. Results of this project may be published 
but any data included will in no way be linked to any individual child. In accordance with the 
requirements of some scientific journals and organisations, the coded data may be shared with 
other competent researchers. Again, your child’s anonymity will be preserved. 
 Consent forms and coded data will be kept for five years after publication. 
 
What happens to the information that you provide? 
 After enough information has been collected, the overall findings may be submitted for 
publication in a scientific journal, presented at a scientific conference or deposited as a thesis in 
the Victoria University Library. 
 The overall findings may form part a PhD thesis, Masters thesis, or Honours research project that 
will be submitted for assessment.  
 Summary information about the general findings from this study will be sent to your child’s 
school when the study is completed and the analyses of the findings available.  
 
How can you contact us? 
 If you have any further questions regarding this study please do not hesitate to contact John 
Bell (E-mail: John.Bell@vuw.ac.nz; phone 0276363948) or the project supervisor Dr Jason Low 
(E-mail: Jason.Low@vuw.ac.nz; phone: 463-6721). 
 
What should you do if you want to give permission for your child to take part? 
 Should you give consent for your child to participate, please complete and return the attached 
Statement of Informed Consent to your child’s school teacher as soon as possible.  
 
Whether or not you decide that your child can take part in this research, we would like to thank 
you for considering this opportunity. 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Bell and Dr Jason Low 
School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington 
PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand 
E-mail: John.Bell@vuw.ac.nz OR Jason.Low@vuw.ac.nz 
Phone: 0276363948 OR 463-6721 
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Research Project: What Young Children Understand about People’s Minds 
John Bell and Dr Jason Low 
 
Consent Form 
I have read the information about this research and I understand that: 
 I can withdraw my child at any time, without needing to give a reason, prior to the end of his or 
her participation. My child can also refuse to participate. 
 My child will be filmed to help learn about children’s gaze responses, and film recordings will be 
wiped after analysis.   
 My child will never be identified in the research project or in any other presentation or 
publication. The information my child provides will be coded by number only. 
 All response sheets and coded information will be stored separately from consent forms. 
 The data, which the results of the study depend upon, will be treated in strictest confidence. 
 The results of the study may be published but my child’s anonymity will be preserved. 
 
I agree that my child can participate in this research. 
Name of Parent or Guardian:  __________________________________ 
Signature of Parent or Guardian:  __________________________________ 
 
Date of Signature:   __________________________________ 
 
Name of Participating Child:  __________________________________ 
 
Participating Child’s Age:   _______ Years _______ Months 
 
If you would like a summary of findings when it is available, please write your e-mail here:  
 
 
PLEASE RETURN THIS STATEMENT TO YOUR CHILD’S SCHOOL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 
